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Managing uncertain yields and prices before plant-
ing is a primary concern to producers, especially 
when financial ruin is at stake.  To manage uncer-
tainty, producers are presented with a complex set of 
financial tools from both public sources (crop insur-
ance and Farm Bill) and private sources (commodity 
futures markets). Over time these tools and their re-
lation have evolved.  Prior to the mid-1990s, before 
crop insurance expanded, producers relied primarily 
on privately operated commodity futures markets 
and publicly funded government programs, such as 
the disaster assistance program and the loan defi-
ciency program, to reduce income uncertainty.  
Since this time the U.S. government has dramatically 
enhanced the Federal Crop Insurance Program, 
making it the primary publicly funded government 
program available to producers. 
 
The producer’s decision environment is further com-
plicated by crop insurance covering not only yield 
uncertainty but also price uncertainty.  Of all availa-
ble insurance contract choices, revenue protection 
(RP), which adds price protection to the yield com-
ponent, creates a direct link to futures markets.    
 
The goal of pre-harvest price hedging (hereafter re-
ferred to as hedging) is to reduce exposure to price 
uncertainty.  However, the resulting impact on net 
income uncertainty is not clear because the pre-sold 
crop is yet to be produced. Therefore, net income 
uncertainty from crop shortfalls could increase be-
cause selling more crop than is actually produced 
would require the producer to buy back pre-sold fu-
tures positions (McKinnon 1967).  Production un-
certainty and the strength of the farm yield-price 
correlation  are two  primary  factors  influencing the  
December 2, 2015 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  11/27/15 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  .  172.38  138.00  127.00 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  303.83  225.42  196.97 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  256.64  200.88  180.95 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  256.78  216.03  203.77 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  85.91  68.32  51.38 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92.58  87.50  72.05 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  *  158.51  * 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  384.05  360.60  362.45 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6.00  3.95  3.85 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  3.52  3.44  3.44 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  9.62  8.29  8.14 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6.73  5.89  5.61 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.21  2.60  2.77 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  *  180.00  182.50 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  *  75.00  75.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  *  77.50  80.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  125.00  111.25  130.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45.50  56.00  50.00 
 ⃰  No Market          
probability of buying back pre-sold futures price hedges, 
possibly at prices higher than were offered in the spring 
(McKinnon 1967).  This negative relation between yields 
and prices is often referred to as the natural hedge and is 
relevant in decision making under uncertainty (Finger, 
2012). If prices of pre-sold futures positions are higher 
than currently offered prices, then buying those positions 
back would be financially painful.  Having the right crop 
insurance policy in place can substantially reduce this fi-
nancial pain, because crop insurance would pay when yield 
(or price for a revenue based policy) drops below a prede-
termined level.  Consequently, crop insurance and hedging 
appear to complement each other.  Crop insurance and 
hedging may also be substitutes.  For example, producers 
may purchase a RP product with a higher coverage level 
and consequently reduce the level of pre-harvest hedging.   
 
Investigating the relation between crop insurance, Farm 
Bill and hedging and their combined effect on farm net 
income risk provides challenges.  The producer’s yield dis-
tribution, futures price distribution, and dependence be-
tween yield and price must be determined.  Farm Bill pay-
ments depend upon a complicated set of conditions:     
program election (Agricultural Risk Coverage, County 
(ARC-Co) and Individual (ARC-Ic), Price Loss Coverage 
(PLC) and/or Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO)), the 
overall size of operation, percent base acres relative to 
planted, percent base acres per crop, percent bases acre per 
farm, crop insurance coverage level, PLC yield per farm 
and unknown random variables that change each year such 
as farm’s (and county) actual yield, the spring and fall price 
guarantee for his underlying crop insurance policy, the 
Marketing Year Average (MYA) price and inputs deter-
mining Farm Bill option expected revenues. We focus on 
net income, rather than revenue, because production costs 
vary with yields.  The primary issue facing the modeler is 
how to represent the producer’s underlying joint distribu-
tion between yields and prices and MYA price, which com-
prehensively combines this information.  Farm location 
influences the yield distribution, price distribution, and 
shape of the yield-price joint distribution, making it diffi-
cult to identify the efficient set of crop insurance contracts 
Farm Bill, and hedging levels.  Additionally, wide-ranging 
opinions about what producers should do become irrele-
vant if producer yield uncertainty, price uncertainty, pro-
duction costs, Farm Bill components (i.e., base acres), and 
yield-price joint distribution are ignored or misunder-
stood.  
Producer Risk 
 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) uses information from 
the joint probability distribution function to rank each 
portfolio  (Markowitz, 1952).  MPT  explores  tradeoffs  be- 
tween mean and variance.  We extend the concepts of 
MPT to explore  tradeoffs  between  the short-term  ob-
jective  of positive expected net income and the long-
term objective of avoiding farm ruin (what we define as 
risk).  Our objective of avoiding farm ruin focuses only 
on downside uncertainty, or the left-hand tail of the net 
income distribution, where bad net income outcomes 
with low probabilities occur. 
Price and Yield Distributions 
 
We investigate price uncertainty through the use of 
commodity market option prices within the framework 
of the Black-Scholes-Merton model of futures market 
behavior.  This approach incorporates what the com-
modity market views as price uncertainty.  One reason 
commodity markets exist is to provide the best infor-
mation to help make spring predictions about fall pric-
es.  We use producer-level historical yields to capture 
farm yield uncertainty.  
 
An Example 
 
We motivate the risk management decision between 
Farm Bill, crop insurance, and hedging by analyzing 
data from a producer with a long yield history and pro-
duction cost history for corn. 
 
Results indicate that expected income is the highest 
when selecting a RP crop insurance policy and ARC-
CO, and zero hedging (Figure 1).  The next highest ex-
pected income occurs when selecting RP with PLC and 
SCO.  In the presence of a subsidy, it is not surprising 
that government-provided risk management tools in-
crease expected income.  ARC-CO and PLC premiums 
are subsidized at 100% where SCO is subsidized at 65%.  
With a zero premium, the producer will always partici-
pate because they can never be worse off.  Risk manage-
ment results indicate farm ruin is minimized with RP-
80% crop insurance policy, ARC-CO and 40% of ex-
pected production hedged (Figure 2).  Results indicate 
that crop insurance is the foundation of the risk man-
agement platform.  ARC-CO, PLC, and SCO provides 
additional risk management protection but this protec-
tion is small (due to payment limits) in comparison to 
crop insurance.  Crop insurance plus ARC-CO appear 
to complement hedging because Farm Ruin (1% Risk) 
declines as hedging increases.  Farm Bill options appear 
to complement currently offered risk management 
choices, a result indicating the Farm Bill may be an effi-
cient tool to reduce producer risk.   
 
We examined how Farm Bill choices interact with other 
risk management programs, namely crop insurance and 
hedging, a  privately  provided  tool  through a portfolio  
approach.  Our main contribution is that our model ac-
counts for farm yield, county yield, and farm price correla-
tion while connecting the fall futures market price to MYA 
price.  The fall futures market price to MYA price connec-
tion allows us to evaluate Farm Bill choices while facing 
crop insurance and hedging choices.  Our approach of in-
corporating uncertainty into the risk management deci-
sion making process, improves risk management decision 
making when the producer faces multiple programs each 
containing multiple choices.  
For a copy of the complete analysis please contact the 
author. 
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